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Several theories have been proposed to describe the transition from process
to object in mathematical thinking. Yet, what is the nature of this “object”
produced by the “encapsulation” of a process? Here we outline the
development of some of the theories (including Piaget, Dienes, Davis,
Greeno, Dubinsky, Sfard, Gray & Tall) and consider the nature of the
mental objects (apparently) produced through encapsulation, and their role
in the wider development of mathematical thinking. Does the same
developmental route occur in geometry as in arithmetic and algebra? Is the
same development used in axiomatic mathematics?  What is the role played
by visualisation?
Theories of encapsulation/reification
In recent years there has been great interest in the encapsulation (or reification) of a
process into a mental object as a fundamental method of cognitive development in
mathematical thinking. Piaget focused on the idea of a process becoming a mental
object, noting how “actions and operations become thematized objects of thought or
assimilation”. Dienes (1960), following Piaget, used a grammatical metaphor to
formulate how a predicate (or action) becomes the subject of a further predicate, which
may in turn become the subject of another. Davis formulated the same basic idea a
quarter of a century later:
When a procedure is first being learned, one experiences it
almost one step at time; the overall patterns and continuity and
flow of the entire activity are not perceived. But as the procedure
is practised, the procedure itself becomes an entity – it becomes a
thing. It, itself, is an input or object of scrutiny. All of the full
range of perception, analysis, pattern recognition and other
information processing capabilities that can be used on any input
data can be brought to bear on this particular procedure. Its
similarities to some other procedure can be noted, and also its
key points of difference. The procedure, formerly only a thing to
be done – a verb – has now become an object of scrutiny and
analysis; it is now, in this sense, a noun.
(Davis, 1984, pp. 29–30.)
He went on to distinguish a visually moderated sequence where each step is written
down and prompts the next until the problem is solved and an integrated sequence,
conceived as a whole which may itself be organised into sub-procedures. He also used
the term “procedure” as a specific algorithm for implementing a “process” in an
information-processing sense (Davis, 1983, p. 257).
At this time information-processing was focusing on the way in which a
procedure which could be used as an input to another procedure could be conceived as a
“conceptual entity” (Greeno, 1983).
The notion of the transformation of a process into an object took new impetus in
the work of Dubinsky (1991) and Sfard (1991). Sfard hypothesised two approaches to
concept development, one operational focusing on processes, the other structural,
focusing on objects.– 2 –
A constant three-step pattern can be identified in the successive
transitions from operational to structural conceptions: first there
must be a process performed on the already familiar objects, then
the idea of turning this process into a more compact, self-
contained whole should emerge, and finally an ability to view
this new entity as a permanent object in its own right must be
acquired. These three components of concept development will
be called interiorization, condensation, and reification,
respectively.
Condensation means a rather technical change of approach,
which expresses itself in an ability to deal with a given process in
terms of input/output without necessarily considering its
component steps.
Reification is the next step: in the mind of the learner, it
converts the already condensed process into an object-like entity.
… The fact that a process has been interiorized and condensed
into a compact, self-sustained entity, does not mean, by itself,
that a person has acquired the ability to think about it in a
structural way. Without reification, her or his approach will
remain purely operational. (Sfard, 1992, pp. 64–65)
Dubinsky (1991) and his colleagues (Cottrill et al, in press) formulate the encapsulation
of process into object as three stages of a four part theory with the acronym APOS. An
action becomes repeatable as a recognised process, is then encapsulated as a mental
object to later become part of a mental schema.
The notion of action and process are characterised in a manner reminiscent of the
notions of visually moderated sequence and integrated sequence of Davis:
An action is any physical or mental transformation of objects to
obtain other objects. It occurs as a reaction to stimuli which the
individual perceives as external. It may be a single step response,
such as a physical reflex, or an act of recalling some fact from
memory. It may also be a multi-step response, by then it has the
characteristic that at each step, the next step is triggered by what
has come before, rather than by the individual’s conscious
control of the transformation. … When the individual reflects
upon an action, he or she may begin to establish conscious
control over it. We would then say that the action is interiorized,
and it becomes a process. (Cottrill, et al, in press, (our italics))
The action becomes a process when the individual can “describe or reflect upon all of
the steps in the transformation without necessarily performing them.” A process
becomes an object when “the individual becomes aware of the totality of the process,
realizes that transformations can act on it, and is able to construct such
transformations.”
The final part of the APOS structure occurs when “actions, process and objects ...
are organised into structures, which we refer to as schemas.” Here the suggestion is
made that
“an individual can reflect on a schema and act upon it. This
results in the schema becoming a new object. Thus we now see
that there are at least two ways of constructing objects — from
processes and from schemas.”
(Cottrill, et al, in press, (our italics))– 3 –
By considering the developments of concepts in simple arithmetic of whole numbers,
Gray & Tall (1994) reviewed how a lengthy procedure such as “count-all” (count one
set, count another, put the sets together and count all) became compressed into a shorter
procedure “count-on” (with various variations such as “count-both”, “count-on-from-
larger), whilst also developing other techniques, such as remembering “known facts”
and “deriving facts” from a combination of number facts and counting. This shows a
number of different procedures being used to carry out essentially the same process in
increasingly sophisticated ways. The symbol 4+2 occupies a pivotal role, as the process
of addition (by a variety of procedures) and as the concept of sum. Soon the cognitive
structure grows to encompass the fact that 4+2, 2+4, 3+3, 2 times 3, are all essentially
the same mental object. They therefore defined:
An elementary procept is the amalgam of three components: a
process which produces a mathematical object, and a symbol
which is used to represent either process or object.
A procept consists of a collection of elementary procepts which
have the same object. (Gray & Tall, 1994)
This notion of procept proved to be present throughout a large portion of mathematics.
Tall & Thomas (1991) had already noted that, for many children, an expression such as
2 + 3x may be conceived as a process which cannot be carried out until the value of x is
not known – a reinterpretation of the notion of “lack of closure” discussed by earlier
authors. Gray and Tall (1994) also noted the peculiar case of the limit concept where the
(potentially infinite) process of computing a limit may not have a finite algorithm at all.
Thus a procept may exist which has both a process (tending to a limit) and a concept (of
limit), yet there is no procedure to compute the desired result.
Table 1 shows a summary of the discussion so far. It does not intend any direct
correspondence between the stages of the theories, simply that each passes through a
development of growing sophistication from some kind of process/procedure usually
performed step-by-step and ending with an object/concept that can be manipulated as an
entity in its own right. The intermediate stages specified in each line are not intended to
correspond directly, for instance, Greeno’s “input to another procedure” is essentially
the same as conceiving a programming procedure as an entity, whereas Dubinsky’s
characterises the individual’s ability to take control of a repeatable action, and Sfard’s
focus is on the ability to think of the process as a input/output without needing to
consider the intermediate steps.
Piaget (50s) action(s) … … thematised object
Dienes (60s) predicate … … subject
Davis (80s) visually moderated
sequence …
each step prompts the
next
integrated sequence …
seen as a whole, can
be broken into sub-
sequences
a thing, an entity,
a noun
Greeno (80s) procedure … input to another
procedure …
conceptual entity
Dubinsky (80s) action …
each step triggers the
next
interiorized process …
with conscious control
encapsulated
object
Sfard (80s) interiorized process …
process performed
condensed process …
process self-contained
reified object
Gray & Tall
(90s)
procedure …
specific algorithm
process …
conceived as a whole,
irrespective of
algorithm
procept
symbol  evoking
process or concept– 4 –
Table 1 : The transition between process and object
The wider literature of the various authors suggests further similarities and differences
between their ideas. For instance, there seems to be broad agreement that a function as a
process is determined as a whole by input-output, regardless of the internal procedure of
computation. Thus the functions f(x) = 2x+2 and g(x) = 2(x+2) are one and the same as
processes—even though the arithmetic procedures to compute them  have a different
sequence of operations. The intermediate stage(s) intimate how (one or more) specific
procedures become seen as a single process without needing to carry out the
intermediate steps.
What seems more problematic is to explain precisely what is meant by the
“object” hypothesised to be constructed by reification/encapsulation.
What is the “object” of encapsulation?
Dörfler questioned the nature of the object formed by encapsulation:
… my subjective introspection never permitted me to find or
trace something like a mental object for, say, the number 5. What
invariably comes to my mind are certain patterns of dots or other
units, a pentagon, the symbol 5 or V, relations like 5+5=10,
5*5=25, sentences like five is prime, five is odd, 5/30, etc., etc.
But nowhere in my thinking I ever could find something object-
like that behaved like the number 5 as a mathematical object
does. But nevertheless I deem myself able to talk about the
number “five” without having distinctly available for my
thinking a mental object which I could designate as the mental
object “5”. (Dörfler, 1993, pp. 146–147.)
Support for this view comes from interviews on a video produced by Gray & Tall
(1993) in which individuals were asked the following two questions:
What does the word “triangle” mean to you?
What does the word “five” mean to you?
The first was invariably met with a description or definition of a three sided figure as if
the individual had a clear mental picture of what was being described, sometimes
adding other properties, such as “the angles add up to 180”. The second invariably
caused the difficulties described by Dörfler, with some individuals describing “five
objects”, or a property such as “it’s one bigger than four”, yet not being able to describe
what the term “five” meant of itself. However, all were secure when asked to operate
with the number “five”, for instance, that “five plus five” evoked the response “ten”.
We hypothesise that the distinction between the notion “triangle” (which most
would consider as an “object”) and “five”, which Dörfler suggests is not, is the
difference between what we would term a “perceived object” and a “conceived object”.
The first occurs based on perceptual information — seeing a  triangle, physically cutting
out a triangle, touching it, feeling the corners, counting the edges. The focus is therefore
on  specific physical manifestations of the notion of a triangle. The second occurs when
there is reflection on perceptions and actions, so the focus is no longer on the specific
physical manifestations but on the actions/processes performed upon them .
Piaget, as usual, has made pertinent comments in this direction, long before any of
the rest of us. He distinguishes between empirical abstraction deriving knowledge from
the properties inherent in real-world objects and pseudo-empirical abstraction deriving
knowledge from the processes which the individual performs on the objects.– 5 –
A procept, such as number, is a conceived object formed by pseudo-empirical
abstraction. It focuses on the process of counting, building to the idea that different
ways of counting the same set give the same result, leading to the concept of number.
Even though there may be no mental object corresponding precisely to the number “5”
as there is with a perceived object, there is a huge cognitive structure built up allowing
the individual to use the symbol 5 as if it refers to an object. The number “5” has a
concept image, in the sense of Tall & Vinner (1981), consisting of “all the mental
pictures and associated properties and processes” related to the concept in the mind of
the individual.
There is in practice an intimate connection between conceived objects and
operationally defined concepts:
With regard to icons, Piaget’s distinction between the
“figurative” and the “operative” would seem to be of some
importance. Number is not a perceptual but a conceptual
construct; thus it is operative and not figurative. Yet, perceptual
arrangements can be used to “represent” a number figuratively.
Three scratches on a prehistoric figurine, for instance, can be
interpreted as a record of three events. In that sense they may be
said to be “iconic” but their iconicity is indirect.
(Von Glaserfeld, 1987, p. 233).
We suggest that the total cognitive structure of the concept image of number, with its
power to manipulate the symbols and to think of their properties, gives number an
object status. What matters more is not what it is, but what we can do with it.
The “non-existence” of an “object” corresponding to a number is not as strange as
at first seems. Consider, for example, the notion of “animal”, which includes cats, dogs
and gorillas. When we mentally picture an “animal”, which one do we “see”? The name
“animal” is a signifier which can be used to signify any of a wide number of particular
instances but we appear to fail to have a single mental object which is “an animal.”
Nevertheless, to paraphrase Dörfler, although we may fail to have a unique  mental
object for “an animal” we deem ourselves able to talk about it.
The scope of the process-object construction
Once the possibility is conceded that the process-product construction can be conceived
as an “object”, the flood-gates open. By “acting upon” such an object, the action-
process-object construction can be used again and again.
.. the whole of mathematics may therefore be thought of in terms
of the construction of structures, ... mathematical entities move
from one level to another; an operation on such ‘entities’
becomes in its turn an object of the theory, and this process is
repeated until we reach structures that are alternately structuring
or being structured by ‘stronger’ structures. (Piaget, 1972, p. 70)
The various proponents of process-object construction claim a different scope for the
application of their theories. For Dubinsky, following Piaget, a process is any cognitive
process. The notion of “permanent object” arises through “encapsulating the process of
performing transformations in space which do not destroy the physical object”
(Dubinsky et al, 1988, p. 45). A “perceived object” in our sense is, for Dubinsky,
formed by process-object encapsulation. He also sees the theory of encapsulation
applying equally well to the logical construction of formal concepts in advanced
mathematics. He also acknowledged that there may be many cognitive processes
involved in the construction of a mental object, used in an increasingly coherent– 6 –
manner, leading naturally to his later assertion that objects can also be formed by
encapsulating schemas. Dubinsky therefore offers a single, unified theory of
encapsulating cognitive processes as cognitive objects.
However, Piaget’s distinction between empirical abstraction  and pseudo-
empirical abstraction suggests a further subdivision of the growth of knowledge into
constructions focusing on objects being acted upon, and those focusing on actions (and
their subsequent symbolisation and conception as encapsulated objects).
Sfard’s theory of the complementarity of operational and structural sees “two
sides of the same coin”, one focusing on operations and the other on the structure of
objects and relationship between them. This is applied throughout mathematics. For
instance, she classifies solutions to the find the number of boys when “the boys
outnumber the girls by four” as operational in a form such as “add four to the number of
girls” and structural as “x=y+4” (Sfard, 1995, p. 21). In an apparently similar style,
Kieran (1992) considers the (arithmetical) evaluation of an expression such as 2x+3 for
a numerical value of x  as “operational” but their manipulation as “structural”. But there
is a subtle distinction in meaning, for what is “structural” for Kieran becomes
“operational” at a higher level in the sense of Piaget and Sfard, once the expressions are
thought of as manipulable objects.
Further information on the distinction between the two types of conception
include the idea that a structural conception is “supported by visual imagery” whilst an
operational conception is “supported by verbal representations” (Sfard, 1991, p. 33).
Thus the graph of a function is considered structural, whilst the algebraic expression for
a function may be structural or operational. A set-theoretic definition of a function as a
“set of ordered pairs” (with its graphical interpretation) is also considered as
“structural” (ibid., pp. 5, 6). When proof by induction is considered, Sfard (1989, p.
151) classifies them as follows:
•  Operational: for a property P(n), prove P(1) and that P(k)ÞP(k+1)
for all k to establish the truth of P(n) for all natural numbers n,
• Structural: given a set SÍN, prove 1ÎS and kÎSÞk+1ÎS, to
establish S=N.
To highlight the structural way in which the visual can be used to suggest theorems,.
Sfard (1994) provides empirical evidence in which mathematicians use visual and
spatial metaphors to provide them with “intimate familiarity” with structure that gives
“direct insight into the properties of mathematical objects.”
Skemp (1979), separates out the act of building a concept from its more formal
testing. For instance, Archimedes used his “Method” to imagine lines making up a
surface to “build” formulae for area, and then “tested” them using “proof by
exhaustion” for formal publication. In the same way many mathematicians use intuitive
structural conceptions as private constructs before releasing formally presented theories
for public scrutiny. This once again suggests that the “structural” properties of objects
could be usefully further subdivided, on the one hand through the teasing out of
properties of objects, and on the other, specifying some of these properties as criteria to
use for the basis of formal deduction of properties.
Gray & Tall’s notion of procept only occupies part of this scenario because their
notion of “process” is a mathematical process represented by the mathematical
symbolism. Neither the child’s notion of “permanent object”, nor the concept of
“triangle” are procepts because neither has a symbol evoking either process or concept.
A theory of the cognitive development of mathematical concepts from childhood
to professional mathematician is outlined in Tall, (1995). It begins by noting (as did
Sfard) that, when an individual performs actions on objects, the focus of attention may
be either on the objects, or on the actions (and their symbolisation), or on a combination
of both. A focus on the processes in arithmetic leads to their encapsulation as arithmetic
procepts (Gray & Tall, 1994). Elsewhere procepts have different characteristics which
may be described using different adjectives, for instance, computational procepts in– 7 –
arithmetic having built-in processes of computation, template procepts in algebra, with
internal numerical evaluation for specific values of variables and external manipulation
of algebraic expressions, or the limit procepts of the calculus.
A focus on objects, as in geometry, leads to a different sequence of events–teasing
out the properties of the objects, making verbal descriptions, thinking about
relationships, verbalising inferences, formulating verbal proofs, leading to a broad
development after the fashion described by Van Hiele (1986).
Focusing on both operational processes and the properties of objects—either in
turn or at the same time—gives a versatile approach (Tall & Thomas, 1991). This
proves particular valuable when computer software is available to carry out the
processes internally, allowing the individual to focus either on the study of the
processes, which they may carry out, or program, for themselves, or  on the concepts
produced by the computer (Tall & Thomas, 1989). Versatile approaches have proved
successful using visual properties, such as viewing the “local straightness” of graphs to
complement the process of symbolic differentiation to give a derivative function (Tall,
1985), and also using process/concept, such as studying the evaluation of expressions
(carried out by the student) separately from the properties of (equivalent) expressions,
evaluated by the computer (Thomas, 1988).
One final case of “process-object” construction, in the sense of Dubinsky, is the
notion of a defined object. In the sense of Sfard, this has structural overtones because
the definition specifies certain structural criteria. However, constructing objects from
definitions is cognitively subtle. There may be well-known examples of the defined
object which all seem to have a common property, and yet this property may not follow
from the specified criteria. For instance, the notion of triangle carries with it the
properties inherent in 2 dimensional space. Its angles add up to 180˚. Yet if a triangle is
defined formally in some other type of geometry, for instance the geometry on the
surface of a sphere, then the sum of its angles may be different. Just try cutting the skin
of an orange and see. Two cuts through the “north pole” at right angles to one another
meeting a cut round the equator will give a spherical triangle with three right angles,
adding up to 270˚.
We ask, just as we have before, “what is the object obtained by the processes of
definition and deduction?” For instance, if we write down the axioms for a
mathematical group, in what sense is there an object which we call “a group”? We
arrive at the same conundrum as before. We speak of “an animal” without necessarily
having in our mind’s eye a visual mental image for a “general animal”, we know how to
manipulate “5” without having a specific mental image for it as an object. Likewise we
can build up the properties of a “defined object” by deduction from the given criteria
(axioms). For instance, we might deduce that “there is only one, unique, identity
element in a group”. Theorems deduced in this way are then properties shared by all
structures which satisfy the criteria. We just use the same linguistic conventions in
speaking of “a group” as we do in speaking of “an animal”. For instance, we can say “a
group has a unique identity element.”
We have discussed three kinds of object construction: perceived objects, which
are general concepts arising from teasing out the properties of specific objects, procepts,
which involve symbolising processes so that the symbols can be manipulated as objects,
and defined objects, arising from specifying criteria from which properties may be
deduced by formal proof. The “object” of the encapsulation of a process is a way of
thinking which uses a rich concept image to allow it to be a manipulable entity, in part
by using mental processes and relationships to do mathematics and in part to use a name
or symbol to mentally manipulate to think about mathematics.– 8 –
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